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Background: The spatial spread of H5N1 avian influenza, significant ongoing mutations, and long-term persistence
of the virus in some geographic regions has had an enormous impact on the poultry industry and presents a serious
threat to human health.
Methods: We applied phylogenetic analysis, geospatial techniques, and time series models to investigate the
spatiotemporal pattern of H5N1 outbreaks in China and the effect of vaccination on virus evolution.
Results: Results showed obvious spatial and temporal clusters of H5N1 outbreaks on different scales, which
may have been associated with poultry and wild-bird transmission modes of H5N1 viruses. Lead–lag relationships
were found among poultry and wild-bird outbreaks and human cases. Human cases were preceded by poultry
outbreaks, and wild-bird outbreaks were led by human cases. Each clade has gained its own unique spatiotemporal
and genetic dominance. Genetic diversity of the H5N1 virus decreased significantly between 1996 and 2011;
presumably under strong selective pressure of vaccination. Mean evolutionary rates of H5N1 virus increased
after vaccination was adopted in China. A clear signature of positively selected sites in the clade 2.3.2 virus
was discovered and this may have resulted in the emergence of clade 2.3.2.1.
Conclusions: Our study revealed two different transmission modes of H5N1 viruses in China, and indicated a
significant role of poultry in virus dissemination. Furthermore, selective pressure posed by vaccination was
found in virus evolution in the country.Background
A particular subtype of influenza A virus, highly patho-
genic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N1, is transmitted
by contact with infected birds [1]. It is epizootic in many
bird populations, especially in Southeast Asia. Clade 2.2
of the virus has spread globally, including Europe, the
Middle East and Africa after first appearing in Asia in
2005 [2]. The spatial spread of H5N1 avian influenza
and long-term persistence of the virus in some regions
has had an enormous impact on the poultry industry
and presents a serious threat to the health of humans
and migratory birds [3,4]. It has been 17 years since the* Correspondence: bingxu@tsinghua.edu.cn
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in Hong Kong in 1996 [5]. As of 19 May 2013, H5N1 has
caused 628 human cases of influenza in 15 different coun-
tries, with 374 deaths.
The high lethality and virulence of H5N1, its epizootic
presence, its increasingly large host reservoir, its signifi-
cant ongoing mutations, and its potential transmissibility
between humans, make it one of the greatest current pan-
demic threats [6]. Substantial progress has been made in
researching various aspects of the virus and preparing for
a potential influenza pandemic [7,8]. Several studies on
the global spread of avian flu using phylogenetic relation-
ships of virus isolates have indicated that migratory bird
movements, and trade in poultry and wild birds could ex-
plain the pathway for introduction events into different
countries [9,10]. However, the underlying mechanism of
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sponding genetic footprints, remain poorly understood.
China is one of the world primary producers of poultry
products [11], and is among the regions most affected by
H5N1 [12]. Poultry production generates 16 million tons
of meat and 27 million tons of eggs annually in China
[11]. In 2004, the total loss caused by HPAI virus H5N1
was 4.5 billion US dollars in China. To control H5N1 in-
fection in poultry, many countries have implemented a
vaccination policy, including China, Vietnam, Indonesia
and Egypt. In Mainland China, a poultry vaccine was first
used at the end of 2004. Over 55 billion doses of vaccines
were applied to control the outbreaks between 2004 and
2008 [13]. Antigenic variants of H5N1 avian influenza
virus have occurred along with its spatiotemporal trans-
mission. Furthermore, vaccination may change the evolu-
tionary dynamics of H5N1 virus [14,15]. Vaccine strains
can be selected from the seeding region of Southeast Asia
where its genetic and antigenic characteristics can be
determined earlier for human or avian influenza [2,16].
However, the effect of vaccination in China has rarely
been studied and is discussed in the present study.
Here, we applied phylogenetic analysis, geospatial tech-
niques, and time series models to investigate the spatio-
temporal pattern of H5N1 outbreaks in China and the
effect of vaccination on the dynamics of virus evolution.
These data, combined with spatiotemporal information on
the H5N1 outbreaks and viruses, were used to understand
viral evolutionary dynamics from the beginning to its
circulation in China. This study aimed to illustrate the
spatiotemporal pattern of H5N1 outbreaks in China, under-
stand the role of migratory birds and poultry in contribut-
ing such a pattern, and the effect of vaccination on the
dynamics of virus evolution.
Methods
Virus sequences and outbreak data
Full-length hemagglutinin (HA) sequences of HPAI
virus H5N1 were obtained from the GenBank database
(http://www.flu.lanl.gov) hosted by the National Center
for Biotechnology Information (NCBI). A total of 674
non-repetitive sequences were used in the phylogenetic and
selection analysis at provincial level, from 1996 to 2011
(Additional file 1: Table S1). Hosts were classified into dif-
ferent groups, according to the list of species affected by
H5N1 avian influenza from the US Geological Survey
National Wildlife Health Center. We also collected H5N1
outbreak data in China from the World Organisation for
Animal Health (OIE, http://www.oie.int/) and the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, http://
www.fao.org/home/en/), from January 2004 to December
2011. We removed redundant records and geocoded them
according to their spatial information. Mainland China
had 323 outbreaks in total, of which 217 were in poultry,85 in wild birds, and 21 in humans (Figure 1). The HA
sequences of HPAI H5N1 are accurate to the year, while
outbreak records are accurate to the day. The HA se-
quences and outbreak records were not linked, and they
were collected from two separate data sets.
Spatial point pattern analysis
A point pattern analysis of H5N1 outbreaks was used to
determine where the cases were spread, as well as to de-
termine which spatial scales were optimal for disease
clustering [10,17]. Choosing the right scale was critical for
subsequent analyses. We used exploratory spatial statis-
tical techniques to examine the patterns of outbreaks.
Ripley’s K function describes how the expected value of a
point process changes over different spatial and temporal
lags [18,19]. A peak value in Ripley’s K function indicates
a clustering at the scale of the corresponding lag. An esti-
mate of spatial and temporal K function can be calculated
by [20]:
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where R is the total area of the study, n is the number of
observed events, Id(i, j) is an indicator function that
takes a value of 1 when the spherical distance between
points i and j is less than d. Wij is the adjustment
factor of the edge effect. In clustering, K(d) would be
greater than A(d), which is the area of the spherical
circle of arc-radius d; and less than A(d) under regu-
larity. We then apply a transformation to K(d) to have
L dð Þ ¼ R  arccos 1− K dð Þ
2πR2
 
−d , and to plot L(d) against d.
Deviation, L(d), above the zero line suggest clustering
(more events within distance d than expected), while devi-
ations below zero suggest regularity (fewer events within
distance d than expected) [21]. T is the time span from
the earliest to latest outbreak in the dataset; we changed
Gregorian date to Julian date. It (i, j) is an indicator func-
tion that takes a value of 1 when the time interval between
points i and j is less than t. All the calculations used the
same study area – the extent of Mainland China.
The upper and lower bounds were determined by
undertaking Monte Carlo simulations 999 times. For
each simulation, we generated the same number of ran-
dom points as the cases, and then calculated their K
functions. To each lag, the upper and lower bounds were
the minimum and maximum K values among the set of
999 simulations.
Figure 1 H5N1 virus outbreaks, avian and human cases. Outbreak records in China began in January 2004, and outbreaks were mainly
concentrated in four periods: early 2004, late 2005 to early 2006, late 2007 to early 2008, and early 2009.
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Sequences were aligned using the ClustalW algorithm
[22] implemented in BioEdit (version 7.0) [23]. The opti-
mal nucleotide substitution model was selected using
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [24] and a hier-
archical likelihood ratio test in ModelTest [25]. Phylo-
genetic relationships of the 674 H5N1 HA sequences
were constructed using the neighbor-joining approach
and the GTR + I + Γ4 model of nucleotide substitution
by PAUP 4.0 [26]. Tree topology reliability was tested
with 1000 bootstrap replicates. The tree was rooted by
A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 and structured according to
the World Health Organization system of avian influenza
cladistics (http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/
h5n1_nomenclature/en/).
Rates of nucleotide substitution per site and year were es-
timated by the BEAST program [27], which uses a Bayesian
Markov chain Monte Carlo approach. For each analysis
the constant size, exponential growth, Bayesian skyride
and Bayesian skyline coalescent prior were used with the
codon-based SRD06 nucleotide substitution model [28].
The strict and uncorrelated lognormal (UCLN) relaxed
molecular clocks were compared by analyzing values of
the coefficient of variation in the tracer. The statistical un-
certainty in all analyses was reflected by the 95% highest
probability density (HPD) values for parameter estimate.
Additionally, the chain lengths in each analysis were runfor sufficient time to achieve coverage (up to 10 million
generations). To estimate the variations of evolutionary
rates resulting from vaccination, the HA sequences were
categorized by sampling time. We inferred the evolutionary
rates in a window of 2 years with a step of 1 year forward.
To visualize the evolutionary process of the virus, we cal-
culated the genetic distances between any pair of sequences
and reprojected the distances to a genetic map using multi-
dimensional scaling (MDS) [29,30]. MDS created a matrix
of inter-point distances. These points could be recon-
structed using Euclidean distance to replace genetic dis-







where Dij is the genetic distance from strain i to j, and δij
is the estimated Euclidean distance. The MDS method
was conducted in Matlab (version R2009b) (MathWorks,
Natick, MA, USA).
Detection of positively-selected sites
The selective pressure can be detected by measuring nonsy-
nonymous–synonymous rate ratio (dN/dS) [31]. A ratio >1
overall represents positive selection of genes [32]. To illus-
trate the variation of raw mutation rate over sites, we
compared the virus with the HA genes of reassortant
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LPB93 method [33], with introduction of a γ distribution
using the KaKs Calculator (version 2.0) [34]. We aligned
the pair of sequences in a window of 57 bp with a step of
3 bp forward. Fisher’s exact test was applied for justifica-
tion of small sample size. The dN/dS ratio among codons
was calculated using the maximum likelihood method
with the codeml program in PAML 4.5 [35,36], as well as
the fixed effect likelihood (FEL) method implemented in
HyPhy (version 0.99b) [37]. Positive selection was tested
using a likelihood ratio test (LRT) comparing a null model
(M7) that did not allow dN/dS >1 with an alternative
model (M8) that did. M8 had two more parameters than
M7, so that χ22 was used to conduct the LRT [38].
Time series analysis
A cross-correlation function was used for identification
of the relationship between outbreaks in different hosts.
We obtained cross-correlation coefficient time series
based on poultry and wild-bird outbreaks and human
cases. The cross-correlation coefficient time series was
calculated as:
ρxy kð Þ ¼
γxy kð Þ
σxσy
k ¼ 0;  1;  2; ð4Þ
where ρxy (k) is the cross-correlation coefficient at lag k;
σx and σy are standard deviations of X and Y, respectively;
and γ is the covariance function.
The time series analyzed here was characterized by
strong autocorrelation. Thus, an autoregressive integrated
moving average (ARIMA) model [39] was applied to ac-
count for this autocorrelation. An ARIMA model is no-
tated as (p, d, q), where p is the autoregressive (AR) order,
d the differencing order, and q the moving average (MA)
order. The autocorrelation function and partial autocor-
relation function were applied to determine the AR and
MA order. Models and coefficients were examined through
calculated AIC and the coefficient of determination (R2),
and the optimal model in each relationship was selected:
poultry outbreaks lead human cases; human cases lead
poultry outbreaks, wild-bird outbreaks led human cases;
human cases lead wild-bird outbreaks; wild-bird outbreaks
led poultry outbreaks; and poultry outbreaks lead wild-
bird outbreaks. All ARIMA modeling and corresponding
statistical tests were performed using R (version 2.13.2).
Results
Spatial and temporal pattern of H5N1 outbreak
Figure 2a shows values of the spatial K function. There
were three peaks located at approximately 50, 700 and
1200 km for the entire dataset. The poultry outbreaks ex-
hibited the same three peaks as the overall trend (Figure 2b),
whereas wild-bird outbreaks showed a single peak at 50 km(Figure 2c). The 50-km lag corresponded to the average
distance between neighboring counties, within a city or at
a specific locale. The 700- and 1200-km lags may fit the
distance between provinces. Outbreaks in wild birds were
concentrated in the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau, Hong Kong
and Liaoning Province. We suspect that the lag for wild
birds was related to their migration distances; the 50-km
lag corresponded to an outbreak within a city, or at breed-
ing, wintering and stopover sites.
Figure 2d shows values of the temporal K function.
There were two peaks located at approximately 20 and
115 days. Poultry outbreaks exhibited a single peak at
20 days (Figure 2e), while wild-bird outbreaks had a sin-
gle peak at 115 days (Figure 2f ). The 20-day peak may
correspond to poultry trade within a province or between
provinces. The 115-day peak may fit the migration cycle
of migratory birds.
Correlations between poultry and wild-bird outbreaks
and human cases
Outbreak data began in 2004, and there were epidemic
waves during four periods in China: January–February
2004, October 2005–June 2006, January–June 2005, and
December 2008–February 2009. The outbreaks revealed
significant seasonal patterns. Wild-bird outbreaks tended to
concentrate in January, February, April and May; poultry
outbreaks in January, February, June and November; and
human cases in January (Additional file 2: Figure S1).
An ARIMA model was obtained for each of the six re-
lationships (Figure 3), and a total of 384 models (4 × 4 ×
4 × 6, p: 0–4, d: 0–4, q:0–4) were tested (Additional file 3:
Table S2). The results indicated that human cases were
preceded by poultry outbreak with 1–4 months (Figure 3a),
and wild-bird outbreaks were led by human cases with
1–3 months (Figure 3d). These lead–lag relationships
were considered to be stable, with approximately 12 and
11 months periodicity, respectively.
Circulation of H5N1 virus in China, 1996–2011
Virus strains in China were classified into different clades
according to the supplement from WHO (Figures 4a and
Additional file 4: FigureS2). A distribution map of differ-
ent virus clades based on spatiotemporal information of
isolates was drawn (Figure 4b). Clade 0 virus was the
circulating strain at the early stage; after 2004, it was re-
placed and several new clades emerged and began to
circulate, such as 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 7. The virus began to
spread westward and has been detected in almost all of
China since then.
Clade 0 virus circulated in poultry south of the Yangtze
River before 2000. The Yangtze River has been historically
considered as a geographic middle line dividing the coun-
try into north and south. With time, the virus spread
north and crossed the Yangtze River in 2001. After 2004,
Figure 2 Temporal and spatial K-function results. Spatial K-function calculated for: (a) all infections, (b) poultry and (c) wild birds. Temporal
K-function calculated for: (d) all infections, (e) poultry and (f) wild birds. Clusters are shown by thin dashed lines. The peak value in spatial K-function
for wild birds represents the outbreaks in Hong Kong, because of data bias.
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that it may have been replaced by other clades (Figure 5a).
In 2004, clade 2.3.2 emerged in Southern China and clade
7 in Northern China. These may have taken over the dom-
inant role of clade 0 in those parts of the country.
Clade 2.3.2 virus appeared in 2004 and circulated south
of the Yangtze River, except for one wild-bird isolate found
in Qinghai in 2009 [40]. After 2006, a variant of this virus,
clade 2.3.2.1, began circulating in China and Vietnam, and
the regularly-used vaccines did not provide full protection
(Figure 5b). Clade 2.3.4 emerged in 2005 and spread from
Southern to Northern China. It reached Henan Province,
the geographic centroid of the country, in 2006, and ap-
peared in wild birds in Heilongjiang, the northernmost
province, in 2007 (Figure 5c).Clade 7 virus appeared in wild birds in Henan Province
in 2004. In the following year the virus spread south,
reaching Hunan and Yunnan Provinces; however, it disap-
peared in these areas in 2006. The virus also spread north,
reaching Xinjiang and Hebei Provinces, and became the
primary circulating strain in poultry in Northern China
(Figure 5d).
After an outbreak in migratory waterfowl at Qinghai
Lake in 2005 [41], clade 2.2 virus persisted in the
Qinghai–Tibet Plateau region during 2005–2007, and
began to decrease in 2008. Surprisingly, clade 2.2 was
seldom isolated from poultry in China, and it was not
the strain circulating in birds throughout China, although
it had a large and long-lasting global impact on various
host species.
Figure 3 Cross-correlation coefficient time series and ARIMA model-fitted curves. (a) Poultry outbreak – human case; (b) human case – poultry
outbreak; (c) wild-bird outbreak – human case; (d) human case – wild-bird outbreak; (e) wild-bird outbreak – poultry outbreak; and (f) poultry
outbreak – wild-bird outbreak. Thick lines are best-fit results of cross-correlation coefficient time series by ARIMA modeling.
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Three H5N1 avian influenza vaccines, Re-1, Re-4 and
Re-5, were widely adopted in China (Table 1). The Re-1
vaccine was first used at the end of 2004, and for almost
10 years after clade 0 appeared. The Re-4 vaccine was
first used in August 2006, 2 years after clade 7 appeared.
The Re-5 vaccine was first used in May 2008, 4 years
after clade 2.3.4 emerged. After compulsory vaccination
began in 2004, several specific sub-clades appeared, such
as 2.3.2 and 2.3.4. The mean evolutionary rates of H5N1
virus increased after vaccination was implemented in
the country. The mean nucleotide substitution rate for
all H5N1 viruses collected from 1996 to 2004 was 3.77 ×
10−3 substitutions/site/year (95% HPD from 3.33 × 10−3
to 4.22 × 10−3 substitutions/site/year), and 4.39 × 10−3
substitutions/site/year (95% HPD from 4.03 × 10−3 to
4.76 × 10−3 substitutions/site/year) from 2005 to 2012.The results were consistent with those from other countries
where vaccination was adopted [15]. We also conducted a
sliding separation window analysis to examine the vari-
ation of evolutionary rates over time. The results indicated
that evolutionary rates of H5N1 virus increased in the year
when the vaccine was used in China (Additional file 5:
Figure S3, Table 2).
To examine further the effect of vaccination on the gen-
omic dynamics of the virus, we focused on clade 2.3.2 that
circulated in Southern China, and a total of 97 strains
were used for analysis (Additional file 6: Figure S4). The
strain appeared in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces and
Hong Kong in 2004. Then it spread to several neigh-
boring provinces of Southern China (Figure 6a). Based
on the unrooted tree of clade 2.3.2 in the country, it
was clear that the virus was divided into two groups:
classical clade 2.3.2 isolated in 2003–2006, and its
Figure 4 Spatiotemporal distribution of different virus clades isolated from birds in China, 1996–2011. (a) Phylogenetic tree based on
H5N1 HA gene sequences. (b) Distribution of H5N1 virus isolated from birds in China, 1996–2011. The definition criteria of clades were developed
by the WHO/OIE/FAO H5N1 Evolution Working Group: sharing of a common (clade-defining) node in the phylogenetic tree; monophyletic
grouping with a bootstrap value ≥60 at the clade-defining node; and average percentage pairwise nucleotide distances between and within
clades of >1.5% and <1.5%, respectively.
Figure 5 Distribution of prevailing H5N1 virus clades in China. (a) Clade 0; (b) clade 2.3.2; (c) clade 2.3.4; (d) clade 7. Thin black line
represents latitude of Yangtze River. Circle size is proportional to sample size, with smallest circle representing one sample, and largest
18 samples.
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Table 1 Major vaccine types used for control of H5N1
avian influenza in China from 2004 to 2011
Vaccine HA gene donor virus First use
Re-1 A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (Clade 0) End of 2004
Re-4 A/chicken/Shanxi/2/2006 (Clade 7) Aug. 2006
Re-5 A/duck/Anhui/1/2006 (Clade 2.3.4) May 2008
Tian et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:54 Page 8 of 14descendent, clade 2.3.2.1, isolated in 2007–2011. Vari-
ous host species including poultry, wild birds and
humans were infected with these two sub-clades of
virus (Figure 6b).
The genetic map (Figure 6c) revealed that there were
mainly two distinct clusters with one cluster dominated
by poultry stains (81.6% among a total of 49) between
2003 and 2006, and the other cluster dominated by wild-
bird strains (40.7% among a total of 27) between 2007
and 2008. The two clusters displayed in the genetic map
represented the two groups of sub-clades constructed
from the rooted phylogenetic tree. They clearly indicated
that the virus might have been transmitted from domestic
poultry to wild birds during 2006–2007. Although wild-
bird strains have been constantly isolated in Hong Kong
and Qinghai between 2007 and 2008, the virus transmis-
sion started to return to poultry in 2008 and even the new
host of humans in 2009. In 2009–2011, clade 2.3.2.1 de-
veloped in two evolutionary directions. The first was in
Hunan, Qinghai and Hubei Provinces, whereas the second
was in Hong Kong and Zhejiang Province.
The major population divergence of clade 2.3.2 virus
was closely related to the beginning of vaccine use in
China (Figure 6b, Table 1). The first instance of diver-
gence occurred in 2004, corresponding to the use of Re-
1 vaccine; the second in 2006 with Re-4; and the third in
2008 with Re-5 (Figure 6b). The dN/dS ratio comparing
clade 2.3.2 virus with the vaccine antigen was calculated.
It was found that positions of 130–160 in the HA1 pro-
tein were under positive selections during 2005–2011
but not during 2003–2004, suggesting an effect of Re-1
vaccine, which the government started to implement
in 2004 (Figure 7a). Similar phenomena occurred again
in 2006. Positions 118–137 and 161–179 in the HA1
protein exhibited strong signals of positive selection
during 2007–2011 in comparison with those during
2003–2006, suggesting again an effect of Re-4 vaccine,
which the government started to implement in 2006
(Figure 7b).
To identify positively-selected sites among codons in
the HA1 protein and avoid chance mutations, we di-
vided clade 2.3.2 into three groups based on the timing
of three adopted vaccines: unvaccinated group I in
2003–2004; early stage vaccinated group II in 2005–
2006 and 2005–2007; and post-vaccination group III in2007–2008, 2007–2011 and 2009–2011. The results
showed no positively-selected sites in group I; the dN/dS
ratio over all sites was 0.13–0.19 among models. In
group II (2005–2006), model M8 suggested a proportion
of sites (2.7%) under positive selection, with dN/dS ratio =
2.56 (Tables 3 and 4). The LRT statistics for comparing
M7 and M8 were 2 InL = 2 × (InLM8 – InLM7) = 6.38 >
χ25% = 5.99 with d.f. = 2. For 2005–2007, model M8 sug-
gested a proportion of sites (7.4%) under positive selec-
tion, with dN/dS ratio = 1.61 (2 InL = 2 × (InLM8 −
InLM7) = 8.50 > χ25% = 5.99 with d.f. = 2). However, in
group III, the model did not detect any positive selection
in the dataset. The results indicated that the selected
sites occurred after vaccination policy implementation,
and the regularly-used vaccines in China did not provide
full protection against clade 2.3.2.1 virus after 2007.
Some sites in the HA gene (156 and 172 in group II)
were consistently detected as positively selected by both
the M7 and M8 models in codeml and by the FEL
method. We compared the variable sites between clade
2.3.2 (2003–2006) and clade 2.3.2.1 (2007–2011), sum-
marizing the key sites of variation (Table 5). Based on
these results (Figure 7a,b, Tables 3 and 5), we believe
that the amino acid site 156 was under selective pressure
from the vaccine used in China. These results provide
strong support for adaptive evolution of the clade 2.3.2
virus, and that it evolved into clade 2.3.2.1 to escape the
vaccine pressure since 2006.Discussion
In 1996, A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 (H5N1), the pre-
cursor of currently circulating HPAI H5N1 virus was
identified in China [42]. The virus has circulated for
17 years, and presented an imminent threat to humans,
poultry production, and wild animals in China [43,44].
Our study provides insight into the spatiotemporal pat-
tern of H5N1 outbreaks in China and the dynamics of
virus evolution. The results showed obvious spatiotem-
poral clusters of H5N1 outbreaks on different scales as-
sociated with two transmission modes of H5N1 viruses.
Viral evolutionary dynamics were analyzed, and the ef-
fect of vaccination on virus circulation in China was
identified.
Our time series analysis indicated a significant tem-
poral relationship between poultry outbreaks, human
cases, and wild-bird outbreaks. The current transmission
chain of H7N9 virus in the country coincides with this
H5N1 path. Results showed that human cases correlated
with poultry outbreaks with a 1–4-month lag, which in-
dicated that the infection may have started in poultry
from live-bird markets and then transmitted to humans,
even though the timing of wild-bird infection is still un-
certain [45,46]. It is postulated that the virus might have
Table 2 Evolutionary profiles of H5N1 HPAI viruses: comparisons between strict and relaxed (uncorrelated lognormal) molecular clocks using the constant,
exponential growth, Bayesian skyride and Bayesian skyline coalescent prior
Evolutionary rates (sub/site/year) × 10−3 (95% HPD*)
Best fit clock
model
Strict clock Uncorrelated lognormal molecular clock (ULCN)
Constant size Exponential growth Bayesian skyride Bayesian skyline Constant size Exponential growth Bayesian skyride Bayesian skyline
2000-2001 Strict-Skyride 4.15 (2.97-5.44) 3.49 (2.34-4.76) 3.85 (2.98-4.80) 4.12 (3.07-5.39) 4.36 (2.96-5.98) 4.36 (2.93-5.82) 4.61 (3.25-6.08) 4.65 (2.93-6.37)
2001-2002 Strict-Constant 4.06 (3.03-5.17) 3.24 (2.11-4.48) 3.83 (2.92-4.78) 3.72 (2.73-4.72) 5.17 (3.63-6.74) 4.86 (3.21-6.59) 5.16 (3.58-6.63) 5.48 (3.80-7.18)
2002-2003 Strict-Exponential 2.51 (1.87-3.26) 2.34 (1.68-3.09) 2.29 (1.68-2.93) 2.47 (1.81-3.13) 2.52 (1.78-3.29) 2.97 (2.01-3.94) 2.79 (1.85-3.87) 2.61 (1.77-3.49)
2003-2004 Strict-Constant 4.31 (3.38-5.23) 4.15 (3.31-5.00) 4.19 (3.28-5.12) 4.21 (3.24-5.13) 4.83 (3.76-5.93) 4.84 (3.7-6.22) 1.04 (0.01-5.02) 4.86 (3.38-6.60)
2004-2005 Strict-Skyride 6.81 (5.69-7.95) 6.88 (5.66-8.03) 6.63 (5.73-7.56) 6.70 (5.69-7.67) 8.99 (6.69-11.08) 7.83 (6.31-10) 7.15 (5.55-8.46) 7.37 (4.20-9.98)
2005-2006 Strict-Exponential 3.55 (2.94-4.17) 3.62 (3.09-4.19) 3.85 (2.5-5.14) 3.14 (2.03-3.92) 3.52 (2.73-4.44) 4.31 (3.27-5.38) 4.03 (1.25-5.69) 3.44 (1.29-4.53)
2006-2007 UCLN-Exponential 4.18 (3.28-5.17) 3.76 (2.59-4.68) 4.07 (2.8-5.45) 3.41 (2.28-4.47) 5.72 (3.78-7.44) 5.48 (3.99-6.92) 4.83 (1.25-5.69) 5.61 (2.20-8.40)
2007-2008 Strict-Skyline 4.37 (3.29-5.56) 4.19 (3.06-5.37) 4.52 (3.4-5.62) 4.66 (3.63-5.81) 4.08 (2.76-5.55) 4.58 (3.04-6.27) 4.96 (3.63-6.44) 5.01 (3.22-7.13)
2008-2009 Strict-Exponential 4.91 (3.64-6.12) 4.84 (3.58-6.07) 5.03 (3.85-6.26) 4.74 (3.57-6.02) 5.98 (4.04-8.06) 6.33 (3.94-8.79) 7.31 (4.72-10.08) 6.44 (4.12-8.96)
1996-2004 UCLN-Exponential 3.24 (2.92-3.60) 3.19 (2.86-3.51) 4.03 (3.58-4.52) 3.63 (3.13-4.10) 3.54 (3.08-3.97) 3.77 (3.33-4.22) 4.03 (3.57-4.51) 3.63 (3.13-4.10)
2005-2011 Strict-Constant 4.39 (4.03-4.76) 4.44 (4.06-4.80) 4.35 (3.88-4.81) 4.45 (4.05-4.87) 4.28 (3.67-4.84) 4.26 (3.15-5.11) 4.30 (3.82-4.78) 3.95 (3.58-4.28)













Figure 6 Clade 2.3.2 virus in China. (a) Map of China with clade 2.3.2 isolates from animals. (b) Phylogenetics of H5N1 HA. (c) Genetic map of
HA sequences.
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ment without being detected [47,48]. With an increase
in imported poultry or active poultry production to meet
the demand prior to Lunar New Year activities, most
poultry outbreaks occur during these festivals in China
[49]. Human infections occurred 1–4 months thereafter
because of dense human population, increased exposure,
and possibly evolved high-affinity binding of the virus
to human receptors. Wild-bird infections might occur
last (correlated with human cases with a 1–3-month
lag) after exposure and sufficient population of wild
species. Many wild bird species winter in Southern
China, and start spring migration in early April, and dur-
ing these periods, wild birds may be infected directly
through contact with infected poultry, or the environ-
ment [50].
The transmission mode of poultry was faster, with a
shorter cycle (Figure 2e). Additionally, the evolving cap-
ability for sustained transmission across species barriersrepresents a major adaptive challenge, because the num-
ber of required mutations is often large [51]. However,
a vast number of poultry hosts serve as a reservoir, pro-
viding a sufficient population basis for accumulating
such mutations [52]. Poultry may therefore play a
crucial role in the avian influenza epidemics in the
country.
Study of the spatiotemporal pattern of outbreaks is im-
portant in the prevention and control of epidemics over
large regions [53]. The seasonal characteristics of outbreaks
in different hosts means that as the season alternates, epi-
demic areas shift significantly [17]. The epidemic regions
will naturally be affected by future climate change [54,55].
Poultry outbreaks concentrate in January, February,
June and November. Wild-bird outbreaks concentrate
in January and February in Hong Kong, and April and
May in Northeastern China and Qinghai–Tibet Plateau.
Through spatiotemporal pattern analysis, we can iden-
tify possible areas of subsequent outbreaks around
Figure 7 Detection of positively-selected sites. (a) Positively Selected Sites. dN/dS ratio compared with Re-1 vaccine. (b) dN/dS compared
with Re-4 vaccine. Black lines are the mean dN/dS values of virus strains after vaccination was implemented, compared with the corresponding
vaccine antigen. Mean dN/dS values of virus before vaccination was implemented are shown by green dashed lines.
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for prevention and culling, and establish early warning
systems for regions potentially affected by outbreaks.
The results of this study will help to develop appro-
priate prevention and control policies toward various
host outbreaks in different time periods, to avoid the pos-
sibility of continuous large outbreaks.
A culling plus vaccination mixed strategy was initiated
for control of HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in Mainland China
[56]. The actual effect of vaccination in different years
and epidemic regions is debated. Although direct associ-
ation between vaccination and H5N1 virus evolution is
difficult to establish, we found that both evolutionary
rates and positively selected sites were affected by
vaccination for H5N1 in China. OIE has recognized
that the emergence of clade 2.3.2.1 virus was one of
the genetic mutations occurring as part of neutral virusTable 3 Positively-selected sites in the HA genes of clade 2.3.
Group Year Vaccine M7 M8 Positively
lnL lnL
I 2003-2004 None −2649.7 −2649.6 None
II 2005-2006 Re-1 −4227.7 −4224.5 145,154,15
II 2005-2007 Re-1, Re-4 −4872.9 −4868.6 61,136,145
III 2007-2008 Re-1, Re-4 −3807.5 −3806.1 None
III 2007-2011 Re-1, Re-4, Re-5 −5008.7 −5007.1 None
III 2009-2011 Re-4, Re-5 −4035.2 −4033.8 None
Note. Sites inferred under selection at the 90% level are listed in bold, and those at
†The posterior probability and P value in LRT with null hypothesis of the site are shevolution [57]. However, we believe that the mutation
possibly resulted from vaccination, and some mutation
sites in clade 2.3.2.1 virus exhibited a strong signature of
positive selection, which was against the signature of neu-
tral evolution.
When an outbreak occurs in many regions, simple
culling may not be effective. This is also true in some
other infectious diseases [12]. In developing countries,
controlling virus spread by only long-term, large-scale
culling is an immeasurable encumbrance on human liv-
ing standards [58]. Therefore, vaccination in combination
with culling may be the most appropriate way for the
country to control infections. The evolutionary patterns
and spatiotemporal distribution of the virus are important
in making targeted vaccination policy and developing
appropriate prevention measures [59]. An appropriate
vaccination strategy that includes immunity planning2 virus
selected sites by BEB (>50%)† Positively selected




the 95% level are marked with an asterisk.
own in parenthesis for the BEB and FEL analyses, respectively.
Table 4 Parameter estimates for PAML models
Group Model Parameter estimates Sites* with ω > 1, ω (SE)
II 2005-2006 M7 (β) p = 0.19, q = 0.64
M8 (β & ω) p = 0.63, q = 2.96, f0 = 0.97 145, 1.379 (0.763)








II 2006-2007 M7 (β) p = 0.16, q = 0.60
M8 (β & ω) p = 1.81, q = 13.43, f0 = 0.93 61, 1.229 (0.634)













p and q are parameters of the β distribution. f is the proportion of sites assigned to an individual ω (= dN/dS) category or to a β distribution with shape parameters
p and q, f1 = 1 – f0. Sites inferred under selection at the 90% level are listed in bold, and those at the 95% level are marked with an asterisk.
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culating virus and its possible evolutionary pattern is
more important than efficacy of the vaccine itself [60].
The limitations of this study should be mentioned.
First, the spatiotemporal information of H5N1 virus
depended on sampling. Virus samples may have been
concentrated in supposed high-risk areas, which
could have led to data bias. Second, H5N1 outbreak
information was collected from a passive surveillance
system, and data quality varied significantly across
provinces.Table 5 Key modified sites between the classical clade 2.3.2 a
Clade Codon position
18 61 69 136 1
Classical 2.3.2 Gln (100%) Asp (97.96%) Arg (97.96%) Ser (97.96%) S
2.3.2.1 His (100%) Asn (91.67%) Lys (100%) Asp (95.83%) A
Note. Based on the results of Figure 7a and b, we conclude that the virus may have
indicates that site 156 received selective pressure with 95% probability. The table s
2.3.2.1 virus.Conclusions
In this study, we highlighted two transmission modes on a re-
gional scale through a spatiotemporal analysis, and revealed
lead–lag relationships among poultry outbreaks,–human
cases and wild-bird outbreaks. We analyzed the circulation of
H5N1 virus, and established an effect of vaccination on virus
evolution in China. In conclusion, the H5N1 virus has be-
come endemic in China, and variant strains continue to
emerge [42,49]. For infection control, we need to develop
effective vaccination and culling strategies, based on ana-
lysis of outbreaks and evolutionary patterns of H5N1 virus.nd clade 2.3.2.1 virus, China
56 178 196 242 279
er (91.84%) Arg (95.92%) Asn (53.06%) Met (95.92%) Ala (100%)
sn (93.75%) Lys (100%) Asp (95.83%) Ile (100%) Thr (91.67%)
escaped from the vaccine in sites 118–137, 130–160 and 161–179. Table 3
ummarizes the key sites that varied from the classical clade 2.3.2 virus to clade
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